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In recent years ideas of resilience have been increasingly 
embedded within urban planning and design practice as 
attempts have been made to make the built environment 
and critical infrastructure more resistant to external risk 
from natural hazards, particularly those associated with 
climate change, or from new security challenges facing 
many cities as a result of the ongoing threat of terrorism. 
The rapid renaissance of central urban areas in the last 
decade has given ample opportunities to apply such 
resilient principles to the construction of new buildings 
or regeneration areas, facilitated by changes in building 
regulations and the planning system concerned with 
broader issues of safety and sustainability. This paper 
argues that the embedding of resilience into the plan-
ning, design and engineering of the built environment is 
about not only security and community safety concerns 
but also the environmental benefi ts that might be 
achieved by integrating secure and sustainable design. 
The authors also argue that to date there has been 
limited integration of security and sustainability 
construction principles but that signifi cant opportunities 
exist in the future for such sustainable urbanism to be 
commonplace. 
1. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A RESILIENT CITY
In recent years metaphors of ‘resilience’ have been used to 
describe how cities are attempting to embed security and risk 
management features into the built environment. Resilience is 
understood as, ‘the ability of social units (e.g. organizations, 
communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of 
disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in 
ways that minimise social disruption and mitigate the effects of 
future disasters’.1 This increased focus on resilience is seen as 
part of a broader drive towards more ‘safe’ and sustainable 
communities and in particular is connected to concerns about 
environmental sustainability. The protection of the built 
environment has received widespread attention as a result of 
concerns over the impact of natural hazards2–4 or a large-scale 
terrorist attack5 on the functioning of large urban areas. Recent 
initiatives to protect the built environment have focused on the 
capability of the built environment to both resist and recover 
rapidly following disastrous events. Dainty and Bosher, 
however, have suggested that the nature of the interaction in 
the UK between those who plan, design, construct, operate and 
maintain the built environment provides a problematic context 
within which to integrate urban resilience.6 The socio-political 
landscape of the construction industry and associated 
professions, plus the speed and profi t motives of many urban 
regenerators7 arguably act as fundamental impediments to the 
achievability of this goal. Attaining urban resilience will 
therefore demand a paradigm shift in the way that built 
environment professionals integrate their activities and interact 
with the communities within which built assets reside.6 As 
David Godschalk argues, ‘If we are to take the achievement of 
urban resilience seriously, we need to build the goal of the 
resilient city into the everyday practice of city planners, 
engineers, architects, emergency managers, developers and 
other urban professionals’.8
Recent years have witnessed a shift to a more transdisciplinary 
concept of resilience that integrates the physical (both built and 
natural) and socio-political aspects of resilience. This change 
has been crucial because the socio-political and managerial 
aspects are arguably as important to the attainment of 
resilience as the physical aspects; resilient engineering also 
demands a more resilient infrastructural context with regard to 
the professions and the structures and processes which govern 
construction activity.6 Therefore, ‘a resilient built environment 
should be designed, located, built, operated and maintained in 
a way that maximises the ability of built assets, associated 
support systems (physical and institutional) and the people that 
reside or work within the built assets, to withstand, recover 
from, and mitigate for the impacts of extreme natural and 
human-induced hazards’.6
In short, how can cities be made more ‘resilient’ particularly in 
the context of sustainable urban regeneration initiatives? The 
present authors argue in this paper that this requires not just 
engineering solutions to ‘harden’ buildings from potential 
attack, but also systems of governance that seek a co-ordinated 
effort among built environment professionals. As Richard Little 
has noted, resilience is not just about physical robustness or 
designing out risk, and that a fully inclusive governance 
system be enacted for dealing with resilience.
Developing a successful strategy for urban security 
requires that these interactions be understood and 
enabled by all involved stakeholders. Security will be 
neither holistic nor effective if it is restricted to narrow 
professional or disciplinary stovepipes or if interactions 
among government offi cials, security professionals, 
program and fi nancial staff, and emergency responders 
occurs only on a product-by-product basis.9
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Importantly, this push to incorporate resilient principles into 
systems of planning and design has been undertaken in many 
cities within a context of widespread urban revitalisation, 
renewal and regeneration, particularly in the central areas of 
cities. This ‘design-led’ approach, commonly referred to in the 
UK as ‘urban renaissance’ and in North America and beyond as 
‘new urbanism’, has stimulated an array of new commercial 
and residential buildings, often making extended use of glass 
(perhaps the greatest cause of injury in bomb blasts is caused 
by glass fragments), and has been focused upon improving the 
liveability of urban areas by promoting the greater use of 
public spaces, greater access to the public realm more gener-
ally, and the ongoing ‘beautifi cation’ of many central city 
areas.10 Alongside a new-look urban design has come the 
opportunity (and in many cases the necessity) to integrate an 
array of security features in the design and maintenance of the 
city in response to the occurrence of and fear of crime and 
terrorism.11 Equally, given global concerns of climate change, 
issues of environmental sustainability have also begun to be 
seriously considered within the construction of the built 
environment12 and planning for climate change is now a key 
concern within urban design, architecture and planning 
professions.13 
These issues raise a key question: how can built environment 
professionals balance the requirements of counter-terrorism 
with environmental sustainability within regeneration schemes? 
The remainder of this paper is divided into two parts. First, the 
enhanced requirements and implications of safety and security 
(so-called safe growth) within the regenerating built environ-
ment are highlighted. Second, attempts to integrate such 
security concerns with ideas of environmental sustainability are 
discussed. 
2. TARGET HARDENING AND SECURE DESIGN
The embedding of so-called ‘safe growth’ principles is now a 
key concern within the construction of the built environment. 
The ‘safe growth’ movement—which has developed in recent 
years in America as a reaction to natural hazards and the 
increased risk of terrorist attack—is a set of principles by 
which urban planners in particular, and built environment 
professionals more generally, can consider multiple types of 
risk, including crime, terrorism and natural hazards, in planned 
or existing developments.14 For example, the American 
Planning Association highlights that ‘planners and policy 
makers must consider the sources of risk, such as geologic or 
weather-related natural hazards, technological hazards 
that generate pollution or poisons, terror, error, crime, and 
economic’.15 
In short, ‘safe growth’ uses planning to increase community 
safety through encouraging the building of resilience in design 
and management systems. It also aims to facilitate a joined-up 
approach to development among emergency planners, spatial 
planners and other built environment professionals through 
incorporating risk management into built environment 
decision-making.16 
In the UK such guidance on the links between safety and 
security and design, planning and regeneration have 
traditionally come through publications such as Safer Places: 
The Planning System and Crime Prevention17 and more 
localised supplementary guidance for ‘designing out crime’ or 
the adoption of ‘secure by design’ principles. More recently, 
and given the increased threat from terrorism to the urban 
environment, some countries are now beginning to consider 
how built environment professionals might assist in designing 
out, or reducing the impact of, terrorism. This has meant that in 
some contexts security professionals and planners are 
beginning to work side by side in an attempt to design-in crime 
reduction and counter-terrorist security features to new 
developments or existing urban spaces deemed a potential 
target of attack. 
This focus on embedding safety and security features into the 
urban realm as a response to terrorism is not unprecedented. 
Going back as far as the early 1970s in Northern Ireland, brutal 
target hardening against an array of likely targets such as 
police stations and army barracks was seen, as well as the 
sealing off of commercial districts in a number of towns by a 
combination of concrete blocks and razor wire and, in the case 
of Belfast city centre, a ring of tall steel gates (the so-called 
ring of steel) to stop vehicle access.18 More recently, in 
Manchester after the 1996 bomb attack by the Provisional IRA, 
which devastated a large part of the city centre, a commitment 
to embed security features into the new regeneration 
master-plans to improve the resilience of the city have been 
vital for boosting the attractiveness of the city centre as a safe 
and secure commercial and residential environment, and a 
high-profi le events venue.19 Such measures embedded within 
the design of the new remodelled city centre over recent years 
include a vehicle access system that bars non-bus traffi c from 
the city centre by a series of retractable steel bollards (Fig. 1), 
bomb-proof litter bins (Fig. 2) and a state-of-the-art centralised 
closed-circuit television (CCTV) scheme (Fig. 3).20
Such counter-terror design solutions do, more often than not, 
take a technical determinist approach, which means that 
‘fortress-like’ environments with an emphasis on territorial 
security are encouraged or seen as ‘the way to go’. This now 
often involves advice being given about the target hardened 
properties of building structures (blast-proof glass and non-
fragmentary materials), ‘toughened’ barriers to create check-
points at access and egress points to a facility, or the creation 
of a suitable stand-off area between a public road and a 
building. Highlighting the tactics that might be utilised to 
counter the impacts of terrorism David Hadden, security 
consultant at Arup, has identifi ed a number of the key 
principles that should be considered early in the planning and 
design process.21
(a) Defl ect an attack by showing through layout, security and 
defences that the chance of success for the terrorist is 
small. Targets that are likely to be attractive to terrorists 
should be made anonymous where possible.
(b) Disguise the valuable parts of a potential target, so that the 
energy of attack is wasted on the wrong area and the 
attack, although completed, fails to make the impact 
that the terrorist seeks but is reduced to an acceptable 
annoyance.
(c) Disperse a potential target, so that an attack could 
never involve a large enough area to cause signifi cant 
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Fig. 1.  A system of retractable bollards, which encircle Manchester city centre and limit access to vehicular traffi c
destruction and impact. This may be suitable for rural 
installations but rarely achievable for inner city buildings 
except by the provision of a remote disaster recovery 
centre.
(d) Stop an attack reaching a potential target by erecting a 
physical barrier to the method of attack. This covers a 
range of measures from vehicle bollards and barriers to 
pedestrian entry controls. Against a vehicle bomb, in 
particular, this is the only defence that will be successful in 
minimising the risk of primary damage to the structure and 
façades
(e) Blunt an attack once it reaches its target, by hardening the 
building fabric to absorb the energy of the attack and 
protect valuable assets.
In the UK such principles are not widely utilised, with only a 
minority of built environment professionals considering 
counter-terrorism in their design specifi cations. For example a 
recent survey carried out by the National Counter Terrorism 
Security Offi ce (Nactso) indicates that in London—considered 
the place most likely to be targeted by terrorists attacking the 
UK—only 8% of planners and 24% of architects embrace 
counter-terror ideas in decision making.22 That said, forthcom-
ing government advice is likely to change this mindset. Such 
guidance is likely, in the fi rst instance, to focus on a number of 
Fig. 2. Bomb-proof litter bins installed after the 1996 bomb 
attack
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design instructions, using the principles listed above in a 
similar way to the US Department of Commerce’s National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidance. NIST 
principles apply to the construction of public buildings where 
the goal is to develop a target hardened environment that will 
deter the would-be terrorist from attacking or mitigate the 
impact of an attack if one were to occur. Examples of what has 
been seen as ‘must obey’ design instructions include: setting 
the building back from the street; limiting the number 
of entrances; removing fi rst fl oor windows; having no 
underground car parks; and barrier protection around the site.23
Such a full integration of viewpoints between those that design 
and those with responsibility for securing urban spaces has, 
however, a long way to go. This has been acknowledged in the 
UK by connected streams of research being undertaken by 
government departments and research councils.24 Since 2006 
Nactso has produced a detailed Hostile Vehicle Mitigation guide 
and has been developing guidance for the owners and mangers 
of sports stadia, bars, pubs, clubs and shopping centres, 
advising them of measures they might take to mitigate the 
impacts of terrorism against crowded public spaces.25 These are 
spaces that are often viewed as the centrepieces of design-led 
urban regeneration. This work on defending the regenerated 
spaces of the city was reinforced by pronouncements from the 
UK security minister, Lord West, in November 2007 as part of a 
review of anti-terror plans. This review in particular focused on 
how the architect or urban designer might help ‘design-out’ the 
terrorist threat to public places and transport hubs such as 
rail stations and airports.26 These areas currently are often 
protected, if at all, in a crude manner utilising concrete blocks 
and temporary vehicle control barriers (TVCBs) (see Fig. 4).
Importantly in this review of anti-terror plans in the UK, 
emphasis was placed on security features being as ‘unobtrusive’ 
as possible and being built into design from the pre-
construction phase. This draws on methods popularised in 
North America in the post 9/11 era of utilising softer, more 
subtle and ‘landscaped’ security—what has also been referred to 
as invisible security27—so that security features are designed 
into ornamental fences, sculptures, large fl ower planters, or 
where trees are used as a defensive cordon instead of highly 
visible security barriers (Jersey barriers). For example, security 
planning in Washington D.C. The National Capital Urban 
Design and Security Plan28 has six key goals, which are 
an active attempt to avoid ‘fortress’-style security and to 
coordinate better the future development of security policy. 
The six key goals are as follows.
(a) Provide an appropriate balance between the need to 
accommodate perimeter security for sensitive buildings and 
their occupants and the need to maintain the vitality of the 
public realm.
(b) Provide security in the context of streetscape enhancement 
and public realm beautifi cation, rather than as a separate 
or redundant system of components, the only purpose of 
which is security.
(c) Expand the palette of elements that can gracefully provide 
perimeter security in a manner that does not clutter the 
public realm, while avoiding the monotony of endless 
lines of jersey barriers or bollards, which only evoke 
defensiveness.
(d) Produce a coherent strategy for deploying specifi c families 
of streetscape and security elements in which priority is 
given to achieving aesthetic continuity along streets, rather 
than solutions selected solely by the needs of a particular 
building under the jurisdiction of one public agency.
(e) Provide perimeter security in a manner that does not 
impede the city’s commerce and vitality, excessively 
restrict or impede operational use of sidewalks or 
pedestrian and vehicular mobility, or impact the health of 
existing trees.
(f) Identify an implementation strategy that can be effi ciently 
coordinated in the most cost-effective manner.
Fig. 3.  A state-of-the-art CCTV scheme, which monitors the 
city centre environment
Fig. 4. Crude concrete barriers at Manchester airport, which 
were put in place after the attack against Glasgow airport in 
July 2007
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In the UK the importance of ‘unobtrusive’ security was 
exemplifi ed in Lord West’s (November 2007) report by the 
newly constructed Emirates football stadium in North London, 
which was held up as a model for designing-in counter-
terrorism to new buildings. For example the stadium is ringed 
by a variety of ornaments or streetscape designs, from rein-
forced benches to large brass cannons (Arsenal football club’s 
insignia) and large ‘toughened’ concrete letters spelling out 
‘Arsenal’, which are deliberately situated to prevent vehicle 
access and, according to reports, can stop a 7 t lorry 
(see Fig. 5).29 
At present, and despite a focus on more subtle security 
measures being designed-in to urban regeneration projects and 
schemes, there appear to be a number of long-standing 
disagreements among built environment professionals regard-
ing the desire and practicalities of terror-proofi ng urban areas 
and embedding such resilience into the practices of urban 
regeneration.
First, there is the question of proportionality. Many urban 
professionals are sceptical about current guidance that is 
available to planners, architects and designers regarding the 
need to design-in counter-terrorism. This discussion often 
focuses around perception of threat (i.e. in the UK many see 
London as the only viable target) and long-standing concerns 
about creating a ‘fortress’ mentality and planning for the worst 
possible scenario.30 In short, many built environment profes-
sionals see it as unacceptable to take the sort of solutions being 
suggested by the government and are concerned about possible 
local government legislative changes that might ‘force’ such 
solutions to be adopted. For example, in the same month 
(November 2007) that the government in the UK reaffi rmed its 
desire to design-in security to crowded public places, they also 
issued a wide-ranging consultation document regarding 
national indicators for local authorities and local authority 
partnerships. Buried within this vast document is National 
Indicator 36 (NI 36) under the broad banner of community 
safety but with particular reference to ‘Protection against a 
terrorist attack’. NI 36 indicates that a local authority and its 
partners, in liaison with the local police and specialist counter-
terrorism security advisors, will have a statutory duty to ensure 
that the protection of crowded places is ‘robust’.31
Second, there is the question of acceptability and cost. There 
are concerns about the impact on the general public of 
introducing the high-visibility security measures often 
emphasised by the government security advisors. For example, 
speculation about all mainline rail stations having to construct 
exterior security barriers and consider airport-style screening of 
passengers and their luggage is unlikely to be met with 
enthusiasm from the rail operators and the public owing to cost 
and the vast amount of time it would take to undertake such 
checks. Likewise, it is unlikely that many building owners and 
operators, or developers, will want to install or retrofi t counter-
terrorist designs in areas of the county that do not appear to be 
at severe risk from terrorism.
Third, there is the question of aesthetics. Many recent commen-
tators have argued that the forced adoption of counter-terrorist 
Fig. 5.  The reinforced concrete barrier at an entrance to the Emirates stadium, north London
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principles within design could lead to less visibly pleasing 
architecture and the increased control of access to public space, 
in direct contradistinction to the principles of a design-led 
urban renaissance. As Stephen Bayley points out in a recent 
newspaper article, however, security features (and implicitly 
other hazard mitigation measures) need to be acceptable from 
an aesthetic point of view ‘We might live in dangerous times, 
but they don’t have to be ugly ones too’.32 Here fi nding the 
right balance between ‘subtlety’ and ‘safety’ is vital.33 This is 
not a new argument. Infl uential architectural critic Martin 
Pawley34 argued that as a result of an upsurge in urban 
terrorism, especially against ‘the highly serviced and vulnerable 
built environment of the modern world’, the new wave of 
signature buildings could be replaced by an ‘architecture of 
terror’, as a result of security needs. This he argued could well 
have the function of making the buildings ‘anonymous’, and 
thus, he concluded, a less unattractive terrorist target. He 
further inferred that this ‘architecture of terror’ will be self-
reproducing as planning guidelines once drawn up will be 
diffi cult to withdraw, and such defensive architecture will 
become ‘impossible to resist’ owing to calls to reduce the 
impact of terrorism through urban and architectural design. 
Recent calls by the government in the UK for architects (and by 
inference other built environment professionals) to take a lead 
on designing-out terror highlights how Pawley’s prediction 
might slowly be coming true. Nonetheless it is important to 
bear in mind the differences between security features that 
might be designed-in but are meant to be as ‘unobtrusive’ or 
‘invisible’ as possible, and those that are designed as an active 
and visible deterrent.
3. SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 
In recent decades environmental sustainability, like security, 
has become an increasing priority for planning, architectural 
and construction projects, as well as society at large, and the 
potential clash between these agendas was the driving force 
behind a recent symposium organised by the Public Entity Risk 
Institute in the USA.35 The present authors argue here that one 
way to ensure that security features are embedded in an 
acceptable and appropriate manner within planning and 
design is by integrating such considerations with ideas of 
sustainability and reduced energy consumption.
Although terrorism appears to be the main policy driver behind 
developing increasingly secure urban environments, the 
concern for environmental sustainability is likely in the future 
to be increasingly important in urban design.36 Cozens, for 
example, highlighted the possible complementarity between 
crime prevention and sustainability measures in what he terms 
the new age of ‘sustainable urban environmentalism’.37 In such 
a scenario there is now a need to think critically about building 
in ‘resilience’ to both the design and management of urban 
areas so as to better balance the competing concerns of 
creating an increasingly ‘secure’ and ‘green’ city. 
These competing agendas are not as unconnected as they might 
fi rst appear and opportunities exist to integrate or retrofi t 
sustainable and secure ideas simultaneously in the built 
environment. As Paradis and Tran note ‘on the surface, it may 
appear that secure/safe design has little relationship to 
sustainable design. Yet, security and safety measures, such as 
those for anti-terrorism must be considered within a total 
project context, including impacts on occupants and the 
environment, regardless of the level of protection deemed 
appropriate’.38
In the UK policy advances in countering crime and terrorism 
within the context of environmental sustainability and 
‘resilience’ most notably includes the Sustainable and Secure 
buildings Act (2004). This act, along with a set of building 
regulations, has been developed to further the conservation of 
fuel and power, prevent waste, undue consumption, misuse or 
contamination of water, further the protection or enhancement 
of the environment, facilitate sustainable development and/or 
further the prevention or detection of crime or terrorism.39 The 
Act also meant that for the fi rst time the physical security of 
buildings was legislated for. To date, however, in practice there 
has been a far greater focus on the ‘greening’ of buildings than 
on embracing the requirements of security.40 Rydin et al. have 
even suggested that the ‘green’ aspects of the Act and related 
guidance have been treated with a rather laissez faire attitude, 
in that a review of the government literature ‘could lead to the 
conclusion that sustainable construction is largely a matter for 
the construction industry itself to innovate and self-regulate, 
and for building inspectors to consider in enforcing building 
regulations’.41 It would be pertinent to suggest that similar 
conclusions could also be drawn for the ‘secure’ aspects of the 
Act and that in years to come the alteration of the built 
environment in response to risk (especially terrorism) is likely 
to come from a number of design and governance mechanisms 
that will also have implications for environmental 
sustainability and energy effi ciency.
3.1. Design alteration to balance security and 
sustainability
What is required is a greater integration and balancing of 
sustainability and security as key underlying principles within 
the construction of the built environment.42 These goals can 
sometimes be in confl ict, while at other times might work in 
synergy. The critical question remains how can these priority 
concerns be planned in a joined-up way?38 Practically speaking 
these could also become embedded within building and 
planning codes or guidance for sustainable construction. 
Once again US codes for federal facilities and public buildings 
are leading the way in exploring ideas of joining up energy 
conservation and security for practical reasons and, 
importantly, for cost savings.43 
Although there are very few building designs that combine 
concerns with energy effi ciency and security outside of federal 
or government buildings, examples of practical confl icts 
between security and sustainability might include, for example, 
increasing the glazing on a building for increased sunlight 
and hence reduced heating bills, although from a security 
perspective this increases the glass hazard in the event of 
an explosion (the need here is for laminated glass or the 
application of anti-shatter fi lm) or the need for target harden-
ing through protective building perimeters (stand-off areas), 
which will increase the concreting of open space and increase 
the urban heat island effect. Likewise enacting technological 
measures to increase building resilience might well increase 
electrical loads of buildings.
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Examples of synergies between security and sustainability 
might include developing landscaping systems that are both 
‘green’ and can conform to crime prevention through environ-
mental design principles, for example, ponds and strategically 
planted trees acting as physical barriers instead of expanses of 
concrete and rows of steel bollards. It is also possible that such 
ponds and landscaping features could be used as part of 
sustainable urban drainage systems (SudS) that are designed to 
reduce the occurrence and impact of fl ooding in urban areas. 
Integrating security systems with other built systems at the 
design stage (whole building design) can reduce energy use, as 
can the use of thick thermal walls or window fi lm, which better 
insulates a building while providing additional blast resistant 
cover. Furthermore, developing what engineers refer to as a 
‘tight building envelope’ can reduce the infi ltration of cold air 
and retain thermal performance, as well as reducing the 
permeation of potentially harmful chemical, biological or 
radiological air-borne agents. Table 1 identifi es a series of safe 
design strategies and how they might be integrated with 
sustainable design opportunities.38
In delivering an enhanced level of security, there are of course 
questions of cost to address, which are especially important in 
times of budgetary limitation. For example, retrofi tting or 
retrospective solutions to existing urban landscapes and 
buildings will be far more costly than implementing them in 
new-build projects. In terms of economic effi ciency, there is 
now a tremendous opportunity, especially for new-build 
projects, simultaneously to embed energy-effi cient and security 
features into the built environment, which can ‘contribute to 
the larger goals of an economy less vulnerable to energy 
supply and infrastructure disruptions and to generate long-term 
energy cost savings that will in turn lower the net cost of 
essential security improvements’.43
Importance should be placed on identifying the barriers that 
restrict the opportunities to integrate security and energy-
effi cient measures in the built environment.43 Here a particular 
concern is the often embedded ‘cultures’ of respective security 
and sustainability professionals, which may mitigate against 
joint working practices.43
In the future a more inclusive and joined-up approach to 
integrating security and environmental sustainability should be 
advanced through the greater collaboration between a wide 
range of stakeholders—architects, engineers, planners, the 
police, insurers, surveyors and so on, and, importantly, the 
public—who are, or should be, involved with the planning, 
design, construction, operation and management of the built 
environment.44
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Strategies for safety and security  Sustainable design considerations/opportunities
Access control
Secure site perimeter and use barriers to prevent passage  Integrate with sustainable landscaping scheme. Use natural and/or 
of vehicles environmentally friendly barriers (e.g. trees, retention ponds, 
 recycled-content planters, etc.)
Install electronic access systems (e.g. parking, elevators) Use energy-effi cient systems. Consider renewable and/or 
 distributed energy resources
Surveillance
Place windows and doors to allow for good visibility and avoid  Integrate with daylighting scheme
spaces that permit concealment
Design lighting to reinforce natural surveillance and install  Integrate with building automation and control systems. Use 
intrusion devices and video systems and use screen and  energy-effi cient systems. Consider renewable and/or distributed 
tracking systems energy sources, such as solar power night lighting 
Blast protection
Use building confi gurations for improved resistance to  Integrate with passive solar design and daylighting scheme
blast shock waves
Maximise distances between parking and buildings Integrate with alternative transportation plans
Size and locate windows with detonation points in mind Integrate with daylighting scheme
Use blast- or ballistic-resistant glazing and increase strength of  Use blast- or ballistic-resistant and energy-effi cient window fi lms. 
exterior cladding and non-structural elements Use sustainable materials. Consider thermal benefi ts of 
 strengthened cladding options
Chemical, biological, radiological protection Consider dedicated ventilation and/or exhaust systems
Elevate fresh air intakes Integrate with energy-effi cient systems
Reduce need for utilities Consider renewable and/or distributed energy resources
Apply external air fi ltration and use internal air fi ltration  Integrate with building automation and control systems
technologies
Secure vulnerable areas (e.g. mail rooms, loading docks, storage) Consider dedicated ventilation and/or exhaust systems
Table 1. Integrating strategies for safety, security and sustainability
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